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Empathy and Approval
by
STEPHEN ELLMANN*
Clinical legal educators, repulsed by styles of lawyering that sub-
merge client perceptions and wishes under the weight of lawyer domina-
tion, have repeatedly endorsed the value of empathy. The essence of
empathy, as David Binder, Paul Bergman, and Susan Price have charac-
terized it, lies in the lawyer's conveying to the client the feeling that the
client is being listened to, understood, and accepted-but not judged.1
Empathy, they write, "is the real mortar of an attorney-client (indeed,
any) relationship." 2 Robert Bastress and Joseph Harbaugh agree; they
call empathy "the sine qua non for effective interviewing and counsel-
ing.,,3 It is also a powerful tool for encouraging clients to trust and truly
communicate with their lawyers,4 and a central element of an essential
lawyering technique, the process of "active listening."'5
Empathy is quite different from judgment, either negative or posi-
tive. Binder, Bergman, and Price illustrate this point by analyzing re-
sponses to the following statement by a client:
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. B.A., Harvard College; J.D.,
Harvard Law School. I thank Apalla Chopra, Robert Dinerstein, Deborah Rhode and Nancy
Rosenbloom for their helpful comments on this piece. I also appreciate the comments made by
participants in the "Theoretics of Practice" conference, and I thank the organizers of the con-
ference for the opportunity to present this Essay there.
1. See DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN & SUSAN C. PRICE, LAWYERS AS COUN-
SELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 40, 53 (1991).
2. Id at 53 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
3. ROBERT M. BASTRESS & JOSEPH D. HARBAUGH, INTERVIEWING, COUNSELING,
AND NEGOTIATING: SKILLS FOR EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION 116 (1990). For an insightful
review of this work and of BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, see Robert D. Dinerstein, Clinical
Texts and Contexts, 39 UCLA L. REv. 697 (1992) [hereinafter Dinerstein, Clinical Texts].
4. BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 40; BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 117.
Thomas Shaffer and James Elkins also endorse the lawyer's showing "empathic regard for the
client's feelings" in order to help establish "an open, reflective, supportive atmosphere in the
[lawyer's] office, as soon as the client settles into it." THOMAS L. SHAFFER & JAMES R. EL-
KINS, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL 76, 79-80 (2d ed. 1987).
5. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 53. Bastress & Harbaugh describe similar tech-
niques, BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 116-26, 258-65.
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When the promotion list came out, I was not on it. And I know I had
been on the preliminary list. To see such blatant discrimination made
me realize it was finally time to do something about it.6
One lawyer response to this expression of outrage is: "I don't blame
you." But this is not an empathetic response, the authors explain, be-
cause the lawyer "has judged the appropriateness of the reaction."'7 In
Bastress and Harbaugh's words, "Empathy is not sympathy, nor is it
compassion, reassurance, or denial."' 8 So, too, agreement with a client's
feeling, Thomas Shaffer and James Elkins maintain, "is not the same at
all" as acceptance of that feeling.9 An empathetic response, rather,
might be: "I can understand how upset you must have felt at that
point."10
On closer examination, however, empathy does not seem quite as
nonjudgmental as these distinctions might suggest. I have argued else-
where that an element of approval may be present, or at least perceived,
in empathy as David Binder and his colleagues describe it." Bastress
and Harbaugh make this connection even more plain. They emphasize
the importance of the lawyer's feeling and communicating respect for her
client, and they write that:
6. BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 60.
7. Id.
8. BAmsREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 116.
9. SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 81. The example Shaffer and Elldns criticize is a
particularly awkward one, in which a lawyer responds to a strong statement of grievance from
the client by saying, simply, "Right." See id. at 79. Such a response might be an expression of
agreement with the client's thinking, or it might only be a tepid acknowledgement of the fact
that the client has these thoughts. Shaffer and Elkins' criticism, however, seems to extend
broadly to lawyer responses that "impl[y] that client feelings are presented for agreement or
disagreement by the lawyer." Id. at 81.
10. This example closely follows the phrasing of a response Binder, Bergman, and Price
endorse. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 59-60. Interestingly, Shaffer and Elkins might
argue that this response did not convey empathy, but only acceptance, and that an empathetic
response would have brought "the lawyer's feelings into the interview," and shown that the
lawyer "received and shared the feeling." SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 80. In con-
trast, Bastress and Harbaugh seem to see empathy as a somewhat cooler experience; they view
"shar[ing] the client's values or feelings" as an element of "sympathy" rather than empathy,
and characterize empathy as founded on a depth of understanding that entails "look[ing] at the
case through the client's eyes." BAsTREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 116. They might
criticize this response not for disengagement, but for vagueness-on the ground that so impre-
cise a reflection of what the client has said fails to communicate understanding and may
"meanfl that the counselor is unable to put into words the meaning of what the client has
expressed. Until the lawyer can do just that, any understanding the lawyer might have re-
mains uncommunicated to the client." Id. at 124.
11. See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REv. 717, 738-39 (1987).
This discussion focused in part on an example of empathy in DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C.
PRICE, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 30
(1977); the same example, slightly revised, appears in BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 59-60.
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You communicate respect through ... accurate empathy; your under-
standing of the client's feelings and experiences necessarily implies that
the client has acted, or reacted, in a way that is natural and appropri-
ate. That is, the client's feelings and experiences are
"understandable." 12
It is hard to escape the conclusion that what is "natural and appropri-
ate," and thus "understandable," is also "right." 13 The unsophisticated
client is not likely to perceive his lawyer's respect as unrelated to his
individual worth, although Bastress and Harbaugh characterize it as
"unconditional and nonjudgmental." 14 This perception may be all the
more unlikely given that Bastress and Harbaugh endorse unconditional
and nonjudgmental regard only "[u]nless the client urges means or seeks
ends that offend your values" 15-which is to say only conditionally.
This Essay argues that the positive judgment latent in empathy need
not always remain so veiled. On the-contrary, clients often need, and
lawyers sometimes should be able to offer, a more wholehearted confir-
mation of client feelings. This positive judgment and endorsement of
part or all of the client's world view I call approval. The functions of
such explicit approval are somewhat different from, and potentially in-
consistent with, those of empathy. Although lawyers can effectively
make use of both techniques, they are not interchangeable, and a recogni-
tion of approval's potential value not only adds a technique to lawyers'
repertoire, but also requires lawyers to consider the difficult tradeoffs be-
tween these two powerful forms of communication with clients.1 6 Part I
of this Essay analyzes the functions that approval can serve. Then, in
Part II I examine the tradeoffs its use may entail, and the ways that this
12. BAsTREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130.
13. Compare Ellmann, supra note 11, at 738.
14. BAsTREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130. I made a similar point in discussing
Binder and Price's explication of empathy in Ellmann, supra note 11, at 738-39.
15. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130.
16. Binder, Bergman, and Price are well aware of the power of approval, which they
discuss under the rubric of "recognition." See BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 43. But at least
in their initial discussion they focus on the role of recognition as an approving response to a
client's quality of communication, rather than as a reaction to the value judgments implicit or
explicit in what the client says. Thus, they offer the following comment as an example of
recognition: "Your giving me that information is very helpful." Id; but cf id. at 283, 359
(suggesting that lawyer make clear she "recognizes" the legitimacy of a client's values-as a
preface to.urging him to reconsider them). Bastress and Harbaugh also endorse recognition,
and explicitly identify the approval that goes into it. They urge lawyers, however, to be "very
cautious.., in... expressions of approval as they relate to the 'merits' of a client's problem."
In their view, at least in general, "recognition should be confined to reinforcement of the cli-
ent's cooperation with [the lawyer] or of general character traits." BASTRESS & HARBAUGH,
supra note 3, at 189. For an instance of what may be slightly more specific approval, however,
see id. at 171 (lawyer expressing agreement with client's perception of co-workers' harassing
behavior as "offensive").
April 1992]
technique can and should be integrated into sound client-centered lawy-
ering. Finally, in the concluding section, I will set the consideration of
approval as a technique in the broader context of understanding the na-
ture of the lawyer-client relationship.
I. The Functions of Approval
If approval (and empathy) are powerful forces, it is because they
provide clients with something that clients need or want. To understand
the role of approval, therefore, we need to examine its operation in light
of what clients are likely to want, or need, from their lawyers. 17 The
perspective I offer on what clients seek from their lawyers is not meant to
be radical; on the contrary, I hope to demonstrate that a largely com-
monsensical understanding of clients' needs confirms the potential im-
pact of lawyers' approval. The features that clients seek in their lawyers,
I suggest, include loyalty, respect, warmth, advice, and understanding.
These are elements that tend to enhance the efficacy of the lawyer's per-
formance on the client's behalf, and that also speak to the inescapable
personal needs at play in any human encounter, however ostensibly goal
directed it may be. Approval can contribute to the client's confidence on
each of these scores.
A. Loyalty
Approval functions, first of all, to assure the client of the lawyer's
loyalty. Loyalty is a central concern of all clients. To be sure, some
clients take it for granted. A businesswoman negotiating a transaction,
for example, may simply and reasonably assume that the corporate law-
yer she has retained is committed to achieving her objectives. But even
this client should not, and probably does not, blindly assume that any
lawyer she hires will be loyal to her interests. Instead, she is able to have
the confidence she does only because she has taken steps to insure that it
is well placed: she has, perhaps, chosen a firm with a reputation for pro-
bity, or she has looked for a lawyer known to be sympathetic to business-
people's concerns. If, on the other hand, she were a union leader in the
process of collective bargaining, she would have gone to a union-side la-
bor law firm, rather than a firm known for its representation of manage-
ment. Moreover, she is paying a handsome fee for her lawyer's fidelity,
and she has the resources to sue the lawyer if her expectations are disap-
17. Although this analysis focuses on approval's impact on clients, we will see that the
communication of approval can also serve the lawyer's purposes; it can not only strengthen her
relationships with her clients, but also provide her with an occasion to express her own feelings
and thus vindicate her own autonomy. See infra note 28.
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pointed. Even with all this, such a client may be reassured by her law-
yer's explicitly and "repeatedly convey[ing] a desire to help," as Binder,
Bergman, and Price recommend.18
Many clients, however, are not so sure of their lawyer's good faith-
sometimes for good reason. What benefits lawyers may not benefit cli-
ents, and the various checks on lawyers' temptation to pursue their own
goals at their clients' expense are far from impermeable. 19 Clients who
fear disloyalty will naturally be interested in their lawyers' views of their
activities. They will suspect, after all, that the intensity of many lawyers'
work is affected by whether the lawyers believe in the cause for which
they are working. The rules of legal ethics seek to insure that lawyers are
not personally identified with the causes they advocate, in order to guar-
antee that lawyers' disagreement with those causes does not undermine
their zealousness 2 -but clients may legitimately worry that their law-
yers are not capable of such complete compartmentalization of their own
feelings.
In short, clients have good grounds for wanting to know how their
lawyers feel about them and about their aspirations. Often lawyers seek
to satisfy this concern by developing a reputation that implies assurances
of loyalty. As noted earlier, clients may respond to such reputations by
seeking out lawyers whose general orientation fits their own. But loyalty
is not always implicit or presumed. A victim of discrimination, particu-
larly when speaking with a lawyer of different race, gender, or culture,
may be quite unsure of the lawyer's values. If, for example, the client
18. BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. The authors observe that "[o]ur experience is
that explicit, and sometimes repeated, affirmations of a desire to help [are] enormously reassur-
ing to many clients. This is especially true for new clients, who have had little opportunity to
assess your personal commitment, or for clients who have had previous negative experiences
with other lawyers." Id. at 22 n.22.
19. See generally Anthony V. Alfieri, Reconstructive Poverty Law Practice: Learning Les-
sons of Client Narrative, 100 YALE LJ. 2107 (1991) (examining lawyers' "silenc[ing] and dis-
place[ment]" of clients' stories); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals
and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (arguing that
the objectives of school desegregation lawyers diverged from those of many African-American
parents); Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, LAW & Soc. REv., June 1967, at 15 (examining lawyers' disloyalty
in the practice of criminal law); Lisa G. Lerman, Lying to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 659
(1990) (detailing instances of lawyers' lying to clients, generally in the pursuit of the lawyers'
self-interest); Mark Spiegel, Lawyering and Client Decisionmaking: Informed Consent and the
Legal Profession, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 41, 87-99 (1979) (suggesting that neither "the market,
legal regulation, [nor] systems of norms ... effectively control[s] the [disloyal] behavior of
lawyers").
20. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 3.4(e), 6.2 (com-
ment) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLITY DR 7-106(C)(4), EC 2-27
(1982).
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whose perception of discrimination was quoted earlier2 l is a black wo-
man trying to get a sense of a white male lawyer, she may very much
want reason to believe that the lawyer is not himself deeply tainted by
race or gender prejudice.
Approval speaks directly to such a concern. The lawyer might say,
for example:
I understand how upset you must have been to feel like you had been
discriminated against. Discrimination is a terrible thing. I went to law
school to learn how to use the law to fight it, and I hope I will be able
to help you.
By expressing his agreement with the client's opposition to discrimina-
tion, this lawyer has given the client grounds to believe in his loyalty-
not necessarily conclusive grounds, but at least reason to proceed further.
Nonjudgmental empathetic regard may also suggest the lawyer's loyalty,
by manifesting his capacity for understanding the client's feelings or by
covertly delivering a message of approval.2 2 But actual approval pro-
vides more direct assurance. Such directness is likely to be especially
valuable in situations where the client has reason to be particularly con-
cerned about her lawyer's loyalty: when she sees the lawyer as different
from herself; when she sees the representation as calling for special sacri-
fice or struggle on the part of the lawyer; when she sees the matter as
involving fundamental values; and perhaps when the lawyer calls on her
to act in ways that go beyond her accustomed habits.23 The greater the
client's initial misgivings, the more valuable the direct assurance of ap-
proval may be. Not all clients will need approval, or even empathy, to
21. See supra text accompanying note 6.
22. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
23. Lucie White describes a white organizer working in a black South African commu-
nity that faced "forced removal" at the hands of the government. The organizer was deeply,
but not domineeringly, involved with the community, and engaged in what White sees as a
process of "challeng[ing] domination within the client's consciousness," Lucie E. White, To
Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on Lawyering and Power, 1988 WIs. L. Rnv. 699,
764, through a "dialogic process of reflection and action," id. at 761. This process calls for a
frankness and humility that seem to entail the organizer's willingness to communicate ap-
proval and disapproval. As White puts it:
The organizer had studied Zulu language and culture, and sought in her work to
help the villagers reclaim the knowledge that still remained from that culture. She
urged them to judge the government's actions according to their traditional values,
rather than its laws. At the same time, though, she was outspoken about what she
regarded as the oppressive features of traditional Zulu culture and challenged the
women in particular to take the lead in community life.
Id. at 744. For another extended illustration of a close political engagement between a lawyer
and a disadvantaged client in which the lawyer's approval of her client's concerns is very
evident, see Gerald P. L6pez, Reconceiving Civil Rights Practice: Seven Weeks in the Life of a
Rebellious Collaboration, 77 GEo. L.J. 1603 (1989).
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assure themselves of their lawyers' loyalty,24 but for many-and particu-
larly for many disadvantaged clients in politically charged contexts-ap-
proval may be an essential element in forging a strong lawyer-client
relationship.
B. Respect
Clients are likely to want their lawyers' respect. Respect can con-
tribute to loyalty, and it can encourage empathy and understanding on
the lawyer's part. An atmosphere of respect will also, in many circum-
stances, encourage clients to communicate more fully with their lawyers.
In addition, those lawyers who hope that their own personal interactions
with their clients will help empower those clients must be particularly
concerned to demonstrate respect for them-for clients who do not expe-
rience this respect even from their ally, the lawyer, may be all the more
24. In some contexts, lawyers may be unable to express any general approval of their
clients. In criminal defense practice, for example, few lawyers are likely to feel, or wish to
express, approval of the crimes their clients may have committed. Even here, though, lawyers
may be able to express sincere approval (at least of the "I don't blame you" variety) when
responding to their clients' anger at police conduct or to their desire to avoid imprisonment.
Although the scope of empathy possible in such cases is also likely to be limited, Bastress and
Harbaugh rightly suggest that lawyers in such situations "demonstrate to the client that [they]
genuinely care about the client as a human being presently faced with a serious problem."
BASmEss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 66.
Some criminal defense lawyers, however, may seek to win their clients' confidence less by
any overt expression of empathy or approval than by convincing their clients of their willing-
ness to fight for the clients regardless of what they have done. Tom Wolfe vividly illustrated
one way to make this pitch in his portrayal of a criminal defense lawyer in THE BONFIRE OF
THE VANITIES (Bantam ed. 1988). There Tommy Killian, a criminal defense lawyer, is refus-
ing to do any further work for a client. The client says:
"You dun care."
"It ain't that I dun care, Irene. It's that I dun care anymore. You don't pay
your bills. Don't look at me like that. You're on your own."
"But you gottal What happens if they rearrest me?"
"You shoulda thoughta that, Irene. What did I tell you the first time you
walked into this office? I told you two things. I told you, 'Irene, I'm not gonna be
your friend. I'm gonna be your lawyer. But I'm gonna do more for you than your
friends.' And I said, 'Irene, you know why I do this? I do it for money.'"
14t at 382. Killian seems neither empathetic nor approving; what he promises clients is truly a
hired gun (except that this scene ends with the client breaking into tears and the lawyer agree-
ing to represent her on a rearraigument).
In a somewhat similar vein, F. Lee Bailey recounts an incident in which a "mafioso ...
wanted to control his defense-a decision Bailey didn't care for. 'I told him that I'm an ex-
Marine and that it wouldn't bother me to put a bullet between his eyes and eat spaghetti off his
face.' The client backed off." Stephanie B. Goldberg, On Trial in Foley Square, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1, 1988, at 42, 45, quoted in BAsrRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 320 n.5. Bailey's client
may have weighed the unpleasantness of Bailey's attitude toward him against the aggressive-
ness he could expect such a lawyer to display toward the other side, and decided that his
unpleasant lawyer was just what he needed.
April 1992]
convinced that they lack the capacity to act for themselves. These instru-
mental concerns aside, people enjoy being respected; they do not usually
relish repeated, and perhaps intimate, interactions with those from whom
they feel contempt.25
Empathy may convey respect. It certainly conveys an absence of
disrespect, and for many disadvantaged clients even this attitude from a
professional may be an unusual and welcome experience. Clients may
also perceive an implicit respectful message in the fact that they are not
being judged-a signal that the empathetic listener claims no superiority
over the speaker and, in acknowledgement of their common humanity,
does not judge, but rather offers "unconditional positive regard. '26
Yet it seems possible that clients will pick up another, more dis-
turbing message instead. As clients know very well, lawyers are people
and therefore have values. When a lawyer responds to a client's expres-
sion of his or her beliefs in a way that avoids offering the lawyer's own
beliefs on the matter, the client is likely to notice the withholding. Some
clients may take this as a sign of the lawyer's self-denying focus on the
client's well-being, a sign of the lawyer's welcome subservience, or as the
implicit expression of respect suggested in the previous paragraph. Other
clients, particularly those who start out at a status disadvantage vis-i-vis
their lawyers, may interpret the lawyer's withholding as a form of superi-
ority and, perhaps, disagreement. This reaction must be particularly
likely when the client actually asks the lawyer whether she agrees with
his beliefs and the lawyer avoids answering.27 The client may also take
25. Bastress and Harbaugh consider respect "a basic ingredient of the helping relation-
ship." BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130.
26. The phrase "unconditional positive regard" is Carl Rogers'. See, e.g., CARL ROGERS,
A Client-Centered/Person-Centered Approach to Therapy, reprinted in THE CARL ROGERS
READER 135, 136 (Howard Kirschenbaum & Valerie Land Henderson eds., 1989).
27. A similar potential exists when a professional avoids giving a client personal informa-
tion about the professional's own life. A client who is describing the problems he faces as a
parent, for example, may ask his lawyer if the lawyer has had similar problems. A lawyer who
avoided answering this question could easily be perceived as keeping his distance from the
client. Bastress and Harbaugh argue for the use of "lawyer self-disclosure" in part on similar
grounds. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 267-68. Bastress and Harbaugh describe
self-disclosure as a sharing of the lawyer's "experiences and feelings." Id. at 267. As such,
self-disclosure may not directly express approval (or disapproval) of the client's feelings and
values, cf Dinerstein, Clinical Texts, supra, note 3, at 710-11 n.40 (arguing that Bastress and
Harbaugh are chiefly concerned here with lawyers' sharing experiences rather than values)-
although this technique may well shade into at least implicit approval. Bastress and Harbaugh
also endorse lawyers' frank discussion with their clients of those moral issues on which they
differ. BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130; see also id. at 334-38 (quoting Robert M.
Bastress, Client Centered Counseling and Moral Accountability for Lawyers, 10 J. LEGAL
PROF. 97, 112-13, 117-19, 125-27 (1985)). Though a discussion of differences might imply the
existence of elements of agreement, and clarifying the area of disagreement might even require
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the lawyer's withholding or avoidance as a form of falsehood, and so lose
confidence in the lawyer's "genuineness," an essential basis of lawyer-
client trust.28
Approval offers the lawyer a straightforward way of demonstrating
respect. Since we so often respect those with whom we agree, the lawyer
who expresses her agreement with her client's values, aspirations, or per-
ceptions is suggesting her respect as well. This respect, moreover, is in a
sense more conventional and less grudging than the respect embodied in
empathy. Rather than saying that no one is entitled to judge another, or
that everyone is entitled to respect simply because of his or her human-
ity-propositions many of us probably do not entirely accept-the law-
yer who expresses approval can be taken as saying: "We are entitled to
judge each other, and I judge you positively." 29 At the same time, the
overt identification of areas of agreement, in the passages just cited the authors do not explic-
itly endorse any expression of agreement-or, in other words, approval-on the part of the
lawyer. Indeed, their general position, as already noted, is that lawyers should exercise great
caution in the use of approval. See supra note 16. It seems fair to say that Bastress and
Harbaugh offer more express support for expressions of disagreement with client values than
for expressions of concurrence with them, yet surely disagreement is quite comparable to ap-
proval in its capacity to constrain a client's ability to make his own decisions. Perhaps, how-
ever, Bastress and Harbaugh would respond that, although both forms of lawyer response are
risky, expressions of disagreement on moral grounds serve a more valuable purpose (namely,
avoiding immoral conduct) than do statements of approval. This Essay suggests, however,
that approval also can serve important functions in a client-centered practice of law.
28. Bastress and Harbaugh consider genuineness, like respect, to be a fundamental ele-
ment of a helping relationship. BAnrunss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 109, 126-28.
The lawyer's genuineness, of course, is not only good for the client. Many lawyers also
will want to express their beliefs as part of, or in the course of, their work. One reason for
doing so is to urge the client to accept the lawyer's moral perspective. Indeed, there now
seems to be considerable agreement in clinical literature that some measure of intervention
along these lines is proper and desirable. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 282-84, 358-59;
BAsTREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130, 334-38; SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at
290-319. But cf Robert D. Dinerstein, Client-Centered Counseling: Reappraisal and Refine-
ment, 32 ARIz. L. REv. 501, 561-70 (1990) (pointing to the risk of clients' being compelled to
adopt their lawyers' moral views, and urging that lawyers' advice-giving be very carefully cir-
cumscribed). A second reason is simply to be able to be oneself. A lawyer who deeply op-
posed racial discrimination, regularly represented its victims, and yet felt obliged not to
express to her clients her own opposition to discrimination, would be truncating her presenta-
tion of herself. If her doing so served the client, such a limitation on her autonomy might well
be justified, but this Essay's thesis is that lawyers' self-expression can promote, rather than
undercut, effective lawyer-client relationships.
29. Even those who do feel a respect based solely on shared humanity may well have a
different, additional respect for those men and women whom they see as having not only hu-
manity but also virtue. Clients, moreover, may relish the sense that they merit the latter, more
particularized, connection. William Simon maintains that there is "ample psychological evi-
dence that people need and are fulfilled by the kind of concrete, normatively conditioned rela-
tionships which the ideal of 'unconditional positive regard' repudiates." William H. Simon,
Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV. 487, 518-19 (1980)
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lawyer signals her common humanity with her client by responding to
his views with views of her own, by engaging him rather than distancing
him.30 It is possible, of course, to express approval so condescendingly
that the message sent is one of contempt rather than admiration.31 Yet
approval still seems a potentially more direct path than empathy for con-
veying the lawyer's respect to her client.
C. Warmth
Clients are also likely to look for warmth from their lawyers.3 2 For
the client, the lawyer's warm feelings are a further guarantee of her loy-
alty and can be a source of emotional sustenance, particularly for those
clients whose legal problems are as painful as they are complex. A client
bolstered by a sense of emotional bonding may be better able to face the
difficulties of a legally arduous situation. Such a client may be more re-
sponsive to the lawyer's advice, and while this possibility opens the door
to manipulation, it also offers the hope that good advice, which would
have been discounted by a more reserved client, will now be taken
seriously.
[hereinafter Simon, A New Legal Formalism]. To Simon's mind, "Unconditional positive re-
gard-an ostensibly personal regard which has nothing to do with the specific ends and quali-
ties of either the person regarding or the person regarded-is a kind of intimate, smiling
indifference which is dispensed indiscriminately." Id. at 514.
30. Since engagement can be a sign of respect, it seems likely that even disagreement with
a client's views can convey respect. Thus, "disapproval," as well as approval, may be a vehicle
for showing respect. For an example, see supra note 23. Using disapproval for this purpose,
however, is particularly difficult because often the disrespect present or perceived in any nega-
tive evaluation may sound louder than the respect suggested by the willingness to engage.
31. Cf supra note 9.
32. Some clients, even in difficult legal situations, may not place much weight on their
lawyers' personal warmth. These clients may be more interested in their lawyers' ferocity and
skill, and may endure, or even welcome, abrasive treatment from their lawyer as a signal of
what is in store for their adversaries. Compare the examples of lawyers' conduct in note 24
supra. I suspect, however, that even clients who look forward to their opponents' suffering at
the hands of their lawyers would still prefer to see some signs of warmth toward themselves.
It is also likely that clients' responses to lawyers' warmth are influenced by the gender of
both parties. For example, if women tend to be more concerned than men with establishing
connections between themselves and others, then women clients may be more responsive to
signs of warmth than are men. Men, on the other hand, may be more concerned with issues of
status and control, and might take overt warmth as condescension rather than support. See
generally DEBORAH TANNEN, You JusT DON'T UNDERSTAND: 'WOMEN AND MEN IN CON-
VERSATION 23-48 (1990); cf. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 25-39 (1982); Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doc-
trine, Theory and Practice in the Law School Curriculum: The Logic of Jake's Ladder in the
Context ofAmy's Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDuC. 243 (1988). Men and women clients might also be
particularly sensitive, positively or negatively, to signs of warmth from lawyers of the opposite
sex.
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
EMPATHY AND APPROVAL
Surely it requires little argument to demonstrate that approval can
contribute significantly to the warmth of the lawyer-client relationship. 33
Since we tend to like those with whom we agree, those who receive our
approval can readily and reasonably infer our affection. This is not to
deny that empathy too can fuel a warm relationship; clients who perceive
that they have been empathetically heard and understood may well as-
sume that they also are liked. 34 Perhaps, indeed, it is impossible fully to
understand another without feeling some bond to that other person. The
bond forged by empathy, however, may be more impersonal than the
ordinary ties of affection between people, for a bond based on "uncondi-
tional positive regard," like a religious love of all mankind, seems largely
indifferent to the individual characteristics of particular men and women.
By contrast, approval is part of the cement of ordinary human relations.
D. Advice
Whether lawyers should give their clients advice-that is, whether
they should express opinions about what their clients ought to do-has
been a matter of considerable debate. 35 A number of commentators,
however, now agree that some measure of advice is consistent with a
client-centered practice.36 My own view is that lawyers should in some
circumstances give advice to their clients, either because the client is not
(in the lawyer's judgment) properly assessing his own best interests or
because the client is not giving proper weight (again, in the lawyer's judg-
33. Again, however, gender may sharply affect the impact of approval. Consider, for
example, the suggestion by Shaffer and Elkins that expressing agreement with a client's feel-
ings "implies that client feelings are presented for agreement or disagreement by the lawyer."
SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 81. The discussion in Bastress and Harbaugh also con-
tains hints that the authors see statements of sympathy or reassurance as prone to be superfi-
cial or condescending, though these writers do appear to accept that sympathy can be a
valuable part of a lawyer's response to a client. See BASTRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at
116, 125-26, 168, 223, 229. Deborah Tannen suggests that men are predisposed to experience
sympathy as a form of one-upmanship--I'm superior to you, and look down on you sympa-
thetically"-while women tend to engage in conversations that are, in Tannen's words, "nego-
tiations for closeness in which people try to seek and give confirmation and support, and to
reach consensus." TANNEN, supra note 32, at 24-25.
34. I linked "non-judgmental acceptance" with clients' perception of affection and ap-
proval in Ellmann, supra note 11, at 739.
35. In their first examination of client-centered counseling, Binder and Price generally
discouraged lawyers from giving such advice. Compare BINDER & PRICE, supra note 11, at
166, 186-87, 198-99, with Ellmann, supra note 11, at 744-78 (critiquing the recommendations
of Binder and Price, and suggesting the value of viewing clients as fully competent people for
whom lawyers' advice is a source of assistance rather than domination). The Binder, Berg-
man, and Price volume reflects, however, that the authors' view has changed. See BINDER ET
AL., supra note 1, at xxii.
36. See supra note 28.
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ment) to relevant moral considerations. When the lawyer gives this ad-
vice and is careful not to prevent her client from making his own choice,
she enhances his autonomy rather than undermines it.37
In this process approval is an essential, albeit perilous, corollary to
the advice itself. Suppose, for example, that a lawyer expresses to her
client the view that a course of action the client has in mind is not mor-
ally appropriate. Obviously, she is also expressing her view that another
course of action is appropriate.38 If the client accepts the lawyer's rec-
ommendation, the lawyer presumably considers the client's new decision
morally correct. It would be very odd for the lawyer not to say so! A
client whose lawyer declined to express approval at this point would have
good reason to wonder why the lawyer was so blatantly "hiding the
ball." Such a client might take the lawyer's attitude as arrogant and
alienating. Alternatively, the client might read the lawyer's behavior as
dissembling, and so conclude that some other option, as yet unrevealed,
is the one the lawyer really considers desirable. That suspicion might
prompt further efforts to divine the lawyer's thinking. At the least, it
might sap the client's confidence in his new decision, and since decision-
making is often an ambivalent process, the absence of this confirmation
might undermine the client's willingness to make the moral judgment
that the lawyer endorses. In short, once the lawyer undertakes the re-
sponsibility of giving advice, she cannot follow it up with empathy
alone. 39
37. In some circumstances the exigencies of legal practice can justify even advice-giving
that is manipulative. See generally Ellmann, supra note 11, at 761-78.
38. Lawyers need not be this indirect when they give advice. Rather, they may simply
urge their view of what would be proper conduct, perhaps using the "altruistic appeals" which
Binder and his colleagues appear to endorse as one element of client counseling. See BINDER
ET AL., supra note 1, at 43, 359. A lawyer who gives such explicit advice has essentially
announced in advance what the client needs to do to win her approval.
It might be argued that lawyers can express their own moral views, even views differing
from those held by their clients, without in the process judging the clients. Thus Shaffer and
Elkins, despite their repeated emphasis on the debilitating effects of lawyers' presuming to
judge their clients, call for the lawyer to express her "moral view of her client's behavior."
SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 290. They envision "a conversation between lawyer and
client in which the moral feelings, arguments, and principles of both of us are sought, learned
about, listened to, and accepted as resources." Id. at 297 (emphasis in original). There is
much to be said for this ideal of dialogue, in which the participants neither exalt nor condemn
each other. But it would be a mistake, I think, to understand this dialogue as one in which the
expression of "approval" is inappropriate. On the contrary, a lawyer who means to express
fully her moral view of her client's behavior must sometimes express approval as well as disap-
proval; what makes this moral dialogue a desirable ideal is not the absence of such expressions,
but the fact that they can be offered without overbearing the other.
39. It is particularly difficult to imagine lawyers withholding their views in the context of
the intense lawyer-client engagements envisioned by some scholars who seek ways to use law
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E. Understanding
A central goal and constitutive element of empathy is understand-
ing. Paradoxically, however, clients have reason to question the under-
standing of a lawyer who does not approve of them. Our own self-
understanding is not, after all, value free. When we explain our actions
to ourselves, we tend to believe that we behaved as we did for reasons
which, at least to some extent, were valid. If another person assessed our
behavior in a way that suggested she saw no force in our reasons, we
would say she did not understand our life; had she understood, she
would have seen at least some measure of validity in our thinking. For
example, a lawyer who gave no indication that she recognized the legiti-
macy of the outrage her client, an African-American woman, felt when
encountering discrimination might be viewed by her client as unable to
understand the situation of African-American women in this society. To
the client, such a lawyer "just doesn't get it," and the client is likely to
look for another lawyer who does.
The attack on objectivity in much contemporary legal writing ° also
points to the importance of approval. Empathetic lawyering aspires to a
vision of lawyers capable of overcoming their own limitations of perspec-
tive so as to see or feel the world as other persons do, despite the differ-
ences of race, gender, class, culture, or simply identity that divide us
from each other. The experiences and perspectives of the powerful, how-
ever, are not the same as those of the powerless. To cross the gap-and
to be perceived by one's client as having crossed it-the lawyer generally
needs more than just intellectual curiosity. She needs some sympathetic
identification with those from whom her experience might otherwise sep-
arate her.4 1 Some lawyers may be able to find such identification in their
profound recognition of a shared humanity, but many lawyers may not
feel so universal or so strong a sense of fellowship.4 2 Lawyers of the
as a weapon against social subordination. See supra note 23. Such standoffishness might also
be especially jarring to those clients, such as many women, who place great value on connec-
tions between themselves and those with whom they interact.
40. See, eg., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engen-
dered, 101 HARV. L. Rnv. 10, 31-57 (1987); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism,
Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983).
41. This may not always be the case. A powerful client may confidently expect his law-
yer to make all necessary efforts to understand the client's situation, simply because the lawyer
is so dependent on the client's approval and fees. Even powerful clients, however, may find it
reassuring to think that their lawyers' interest grows out of more than just dependence.
42. Bastress and Harbaugh reprint excerpts of an article in which Bastress utilizes the
psychological theory of Abraham Maslow to argue that self-actualized people, who are the
most psychologically healthy human beings, "'give a certain quantum of respect to any human
being just because he is a human individual."' BAs'rREss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 313
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latter sort may need to feel some measure of approval for their clients in
order to begin to cross the cultural obstacles to understanding. Clients,
in turn, may need some sign of this sentiment to believe they are being
understood.
All this could be accepted, and yet it might be argued that commu-
nicating empathy alone suffices to demonstrate understanding. Often
this is likely to be so. Indeed, approval is no substitute for empathy as a
way to express understanding. Empathetic comments focus on the cli-
ent's perceptions, restating and helping illuminate them for the client as
well as the lawyer. This careful attention to what is being said is essential
to achieving, and probably to demonstrating, understanding. But empa-
thy is not only a matter of visible attentiveness. Instead, empathy is also
meant to convey to the client that he "has acted, or reacted, in a way that
is natural and appropriate." 43 As I have already argued, this message
verges on approval44 and conveys the sense that the lawyer finds a mea-
sure of validity in the client's actions. If the empathetic listener demon-
strates her understanding, in part, by sending this message of validation,
explicit expressions of approval can serve the same purpose by unam-
biguously conveying those sentiments a lawyer shares with her client. In
some situations, moreover, the somewhat muted approval latent in empa-
thy may not be enough to convince a client of the lawyer's capacity for
understanding.45 It is possible that whenever clients are particularly on
edge about their lawyer's loyalty,46 they will also be particularly on edge
about their lawyer's ability to understand them. Thus not only loyalty
(quoting Bastress, supra note 27, at 119-25). Perhaps this is so. But certain features of Bas-
tress' description of self-actualized people seem to embody an equation of maturity with de-
tachment that many women and parents, among others, might question. For example, "'self-
actualizing people are not dependent for their main satisfactions on the real world, or other
people'" and they "make use of solitude and privacy to a much greater degree than the aver-
age person" (though they also have "deeper and more profound interpersonal relations than do
other adults"). Id. I do not think we know yet whether a sense of common humanity, strong
enough to fuel real understanding of people with whom we deeply disagree, is really an integral
element of psychological health.
43. BAsTRss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 130.
44. See supra text accompanying notes 11-15.
45. Suppose, for example, that a male lawyer meets with a woman who has been battered
by her husband, in an attack that took place after similar incidents in which the police had
been called but had refused to make arrests. The woman forcefully expresses her anger at the
police inaction, and wants to sue. The lawyer might offer an empathetic response: "You feel
betrayed by the way the police acted." So far, so good. If the lawyer, however, never went
beyond indicating his understanding of how the client felt, at some point the client naturally
might wonder how the lawyer felt about such police conduct. Perhaps she would even ask.
Only approval-for example, a statement such as "I'm deeply concerned, like you, by this sort
of police conduct"--would then speak to the client's doubts.
46. See supra text accompanying note 23.
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but also understanding can be enhanced by a nonempathetic, approving
response.
II. The Effective Use of Approval
In light of the foregoing analysis, I suggest that approval can pro-
vide a binding force for attorney-client relationships that is different
from, and in some respects stronger than, that generated by empathy.
Approval, however, also has important drawbacks stemming from the
explicit content of the approval message and from the process, and im-
plicit content, of its communication--drawbacks empathy does not
share. This section will first explore the nature of these costs and then
examine the ways in which lawyers can minimize their severity.
Perhaps the most obvious danger is that the attorney's approval of
sentiments her client has voiced may discourage the client from speaking
frankly about aspects of his situation or thoughts that contradict the ide-
als he himself initially expressed and the lawyer initially approved.4 7
Moreover, when approval works it intensifies the emotional ties between
lawyer and client, and these new bonds may lead clients to overlook the
mixed feelings that they actually have. The client may, for example, be-
gin to identify with his lawyer, and so become reluctant to face the ways
that he and the lawyer differ. These dangers exist even when the lawyer
expresses approval sincerely, and with no intention of manipulating her
client; used as a technique of deliberate manipulation, approval would be
all the more troubling.
The process of communicating approval may also deliver unfortu-
nate messages. These messages may be present in the following
exchange:
Client: Nothing upsets me more than to feel like somebody's making a
fool of me.
Lawyer: I completely agree.
Here the lawyer's expression of agreement may not succeed in conveying
to the client that the lawyer really understands the client's feelings. The
lawyer, after all, has not made any effort to put the client's feeling into
words.48 Moreover, the lawyer's injection of her views may divert the
client from the expression of his sentiments into a discussion of the law-
47. The very reason the client did not express his values fully at the outset may be that he
doubted whether the lawyer would approve of all of them; the lawyer who offers approval of
such a client's first expressions confirms the client's doubts about the lawyer's perspective.
48. See SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 78-81; cf. BAsrRESS & HARaAUGH, supra
note 3, at 124 (criticizing the statement "I understand how you feel" as "usually mean[ing]
that the counselor is unable to put into words the meaning of what the client has expressed").
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yer's experience. 49 The lawyer also may be signaling to the client that
the client's feelings are going to be subject to the lawyer's evaluation; this
time, the lawyer approves, but next time she may not, and every time the
client may have to be on guard.50 Even if the client is not intimidated by
this prospect, he may easily be annoyed or put off by it. For her part, the
lawyer who listens to her clients with a view toward judging them is
likely to sacrifice understanding in her zeal to evaluate.5 1
Given these pitfalls, it might be tempting to eschew approval alto-
gether, but I do not believe this option is realistic. I have already sug-
gested that explicit approval is an inevitable accompaniment to explicit
advice-giving. Even the lawyer who refrains from giving advice needs to
build her clients' sense of the lawyer's loyalty, respect, warmth, and un-
derstanding. Approval is likely to be useful for all of these-and so use-
ful, I suspect, that even when it is not explicitly voiced it is often
perceived or inferred by those clients who come to trust their lawyers.
Indeed, it appears that in some cases only explicit approval can fully
convey these messages, and that empathy by itself cannot readily achieve
the same positive impact on the attorney-client relationship.
We must look, therefore, for ways to express approval without inad-
vertently undermining our clients' capacity to speak and choose freely.
Fortunately, there do appear to be several ways that we can modulate
approval so as to diminish this risk. First, and probably most important,
approval must be coordinated with empathy. Empathetic responses are
more attentive to the nuances of client feeling than are approving com-
ments, and less constraining in their impact on the client's freedom to
speak. They provide a central and relatively risk-free path to lawyers'
understanding of, and rapport with, clients. Clinical texts are therefore
right to endorse the value of empathy. Especially in the early stages of a
lawyer-client relationship, lawyers should make more use-probably
much more use--of empathy than of approval. Simply by retaining this
focus on the use of empathy, lawyers can mitigate many of the dangers
49. This danger would have been much greater here if the lawyer had gone on to remi-
nisce about some past occasion when she had been made to look foolish. Bastress and Har-
baugh, in their thoughtful discussion and endorsement of "counselor self-disclosure," are
careful to point out this danger. BAsTrss & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 269. They identify
other risks as well, among them the possibility that the client may see the lawyer's injection of
her experience as a sign that the lawyer is self-centered and not sufficiently concerned with the
client's situation. Id at 269-70.
50. See SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 81. They observe that "[flrom the client's
perspective evaluative communication seems to plug into all of those hidden feelings of guilt
and worthlessness that each of us learned to feel in childhood." Id. at 276.
51. See SHAFFER & ELKINS, .upra note 4, at 275 (quoting CARL ROGERS, CLIENT-CEN-
TERED THERAPY: ITS CURRENT PRACTICE, IMPLICATIONS, AND THEORY (1951)).
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generated by approval, such as inattention and the appearance or reality
of arrogance.
Effective use of approval, however, requires much more than re-
membering to use empathy as well. When lawyers do use approval, they
should work to minimize its pitfalls, and enhance its benefits, by attend-
ing to its content (what they express approval of), manner (how they
express this approval), and timing (when they express it), and by taking
into account the kinds of bonds and differences that exist between law-
yers and clients. These categories certainly overlap, but it is helpful to
separate them for purposes of discussion.
A. Content
The danger posed by the content of a message of approval is that the
client may have feelings inconsistent with what the lawyer is approving.
It follows that the way to minimize this risk is to avoid offering those
expressions of approval that are more likely to override these as yet un-
stated client feelings. Specifically, the risk of constraining a client seems
greater the more directly the lawyer's expressions of approval speak to
the details of the client's situation. A law firm known for representing
minority plaintiffs in discrimination cases, for example, no doubt is im-
plicitly indicating its opposition to discrimination. An individual mem-
ber of this firm might make this explicit, by telling the client early in the
interview that "we'll be happy to discuss your case with you. As you
know, we are always interested in taking cases that challenge this soci-
ety's patterns of discrimination." This comment does encourage the cli-
ent to present her case as an instance of discrimination (a pressure the
client may already have felt). But it does not say, for instance, that the
lawyer agrees that this particular client was the victim of discrimination,
or that the lawyer feels that this particular client should fight this case to
the bitter end-even if the client has just expressed such sentiments
herself.
B. Manner
There are at least two ways in which the lawyer can limit the pres-
sure imposed by her expressions of approval. First, the lawyer can offer
approval in words and tones that are supportive rather than inflam-
matory. For instance, a client might tell the lawyer his ideas about what
needs to be done and say, "Don't you think that's right?"; the lawyer
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who responds, "I do," or even, "Yeah, I'm right with you,"' 52 is offering a
milder response than one who answers, "Yeah, that's the way to really
fight!" So, too, a lawyer who says, "I agree with what you want to do,
but are you sure that this will accomplish it?" is leaving more room for
her client to reassess.
Second, as the answer just given reflects, the lawyer can explicitly
remind her client of the aspects of their work that remain important
apart from their shared values. The lawyer who speaks of her interest in
taking discrimination cases might add, "Of course, we VAil need to dis-
cuss the details of your particular case carefully to see whether you have
a claim that the courts will accept." Such a comment emphasizes that
the lawyer needs to know the facts, even though she shares the client's
apparent opposition to discrimination; it communicates this important
message without overtly doubting (and perhaps implicitly "disapprov-
ing") the client's apparent belief that he has been the victim of discrimi-
nation. Reminding the client that "how we resolve this case is up to you
and not up to me" also might help the client feel free to express qualifica-
tions about his beliefs that could otherwise be suppressed.
It might be objected that the restraints of content and manner just
described come at a price-namely that they dilute the intensity of the
lawyer's approval and so, presumably, tend to weaken the bond that ap-
proval might form. This may well be true. For two reasons, however,
this possibility does not undercut the enterprise of employing approval as
a building block in lawyer-client relations. First, the weakening of this
bond may help to forge other ties between lawyer and client. Approval
does not in itself demonstrate the lawyer's capacity to be hard-nosed and
realistic about the client's chances, and actually may lead clients to sus-
pect that their lawyers are too credulously or intemperately on their side.
The lawyer-client bond is based on efficacy as well as emotion, and some
sacrifice of the solidarity generated by approval may be needed to de-
velop an effective working relationship. Second, the lawyer who initiates
a relationship in a relatively detached fashion can build closer links,
through more pointed expressions of approval, later on in the case. To
examine this strategy further, we need to turn to the issue of timing.
C. Timing
The danger of coercing or manipulating through over-enthusiastic
approval exists at every stage of a lawyer-client relationship, but timing
52. The question and a slightly different version of the "Yeah, I'm right with you" re-
sponse appear in a lawyer-client dialogue in L6pez, supra note 23, at 1678.
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makes a difference to its gravity. The risk of misunderstanding or silenc-
ing a client may be most acute in the early phases of a lawyer-client rela-
tionship.5 3 In this period, when lawyer and client scarcely know each
other, it seems particularly easy for a lawyer who voices premature ap-
proval of some client sentiment to block the client from perceiving or
admitting her own more complex, or perhaps less "attractive," senti-
ments.54 Fortunately, at this stage it may also be relatively easy for the
lawyer to temper her approval without fundamentally damaging her rela-
tionship with potential clients, precisely because clients-much as they
may want reassurance about their lawyer at the start of their dealings
with her-may also understand early restraint in the lawyer's expressions
of approval as reflecting her possession of a proper measure of profes-
sional objectivity and distance.
Later in the relationship the lawyer may be able to offer more spe-
cific, or emphatic, approval without such grave risk. To be sure, the dan-
gers of over-approval do not disappear even then, for a client who has
developed trust and confidence in his lawyer may be particularly eager to
receive that lawyer's approval, and thus become more vulnerable late in
the relationship than early on. At these later stages, however, the lawyer
has more data from which to gauge what the effects of her statements
will be. She may be able to offer approval only in those areas where it
will be most helpful-ideally, those in which the client's need for such
endorsement is greatest and his potential ambivalence is least-for the
lawyer may be in a position to identify those areas as a result of more
empathetic interaction earlier in the lawyer-client relationship. 55 By the
same token, she may come to sense the areas where the client has said
less than all he feels, and take steps to encourage him to speak more
53. Bastress and Harbaugh similarly emphasize the importance of timing in the use of
"advanced empathy," which is the reflection of material that clients "have previously sup-
pressed, either consciously or unconsciously." BASrRESS & HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 264.
Advanced empathy is delicate because it may hit sensitive issues, and because its effort to
reflect what the client has not said may actually misread the client. Effective use of this tech-
nique, Bastress and Harbaugh say, "requires a well-established lawyer-client relationship." Id
Premature use of approval may also make the lawyer seem (and be) judgmental and self-
centered, a danger akin to the risks Bastress and Harbaugh see in the early use of another
technique, counselor self-disclosure. They advise that "[d]uring the early stages of a relation-
ship, counselor self-disclosure should be used sparingly." Id at 271.
54. The lawyer's early expressions of enthusiasm may also undercut rapport with the
client in the event that the client does succeed in voicing these hitherto suppressed views. If the
client decides, on the basis of those views, to revise what he wants from the case, the lawyer
may find herself even further out on a limb.
55. She may also have greater reason to offer approval at this point, because a client who
wants his lawyer's approval may want it more acutely when he knows she has had time to get
to know him and to assess his case.
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freely by offering an empathetic understanding of what has thus far re-
mained less than explicit.
D. Common Ground and Difference Between Lawyer and Client
The bonds and gaps between the lawyer and client may profoundly
affect the impact of the lawyer's use of approval. I have already sug-
gested two aspects of the lawyer-client relationship that may have such
effects. One is the degree to which the client has reason for anxiety about
her lawyer's loyalty or understanding; among other factors, differences
between lawyer and client, whether stemming from widely felt grounds
such as race or from the unique distinctions that exist between any two
people, easily give rise to such concern.5 6 The other is gender; if men and
women understand approval in different ways, and if the sex of the per-
son offering approval further affects its perception,5 7 then it behooves
lawyers of both sexes to consider their use of approval in light of their
own and their client's gender.58 This perspective on gender, however,
suggests a broader proposition as well: there may be many cultural dif-
ferences in the meaning of approval, and many cultural filters on the
perception of approval offered within or across cultural lines. Lawyers
would do well to try to identify all of these differences and take them into
account when communicating with their clients.59
Conclusion: The Uses of Approval and the Differences between
Lawyering and Psychotherapy
The suggestions I have just offered for the effective use of approval
are not meant to provide rules that lawyers can mechanically apply.
Such rules may never be formulable. Moreover, as these suggestions re-
flect, the use of approval is likely to be quite a delicate matter. Poorly
employed, approval may undercut empathy and convey indifference or
56. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 40-42.
57. See supra notes 32-33.
58. Such consideration may lead both male and female lawyers to modify their use of
approval in light of their clients' likely preferences. I do not mean to assume, however, that
what makes the client most comfortable is necessarily what the lawyer should do. A lawyer
might feel, for example, that eliminating her use of approval in order to avoid putting male
clients on the defensive is a form of surrender to male domination, and might therefore refuse
to make this change. Such a decision, however, should be made with, rather than without, a
recognition of its likely impact on the efficacy of the lawyer's relationships with prospective
clients.
59. The same is true with regard to empathy. For example, there are likely to be limits to
what a lawyer from one background can plausibly express empathy (or approval) for in talking
with a client from another background. See BINDER ET AL., supra note 1, at 60. Some gaps
may be too wide to be bridged, at least at the beginning of a relationship.
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even arrogance. Perhaps a recognition of these dangers, and a wholly
justified sensitivity to lawyers' propensity to misunderstand and domi-
nate many of their clients, have contributed to the apparent discount or
discouragement, of approval as a technique of client-centered lawyering.
My object in this Essay has not been to dislodge empathy from its
central role in client-centered practice, but rather to resurrect approval
as another legitimate element in such lawyering. To that end, I have
sought to show that a wise and effective use of approval is possible. In-
deed, I suspect that despite approval's lack of prominence in accounts of
our work, when we examine our actual practices we will find that express
or implicit indications of approval have long played a part, even in client-
centered lawyering. But this Essay is not a conclusive demonstration of
the value of approval. For such a demonstration (or its refutation), law
teachers and practitioners need to recognize the apparent potential of
approval, and then to examine empirically and experientially the values
and the pitfalls of its use, just as we have done with other techniques for
working with clients. This Essay is meant to contribute to this process of
recognition and study, a process that ultimately will enable us to assess,
and to reap, the benefits of this technique.
Considering the role of approval, however, involves more than the
mere assessment of a particular technique. It is fair to say that the use of
approval would constitute a departure from a model of client-centered
therapeutic, or helping, relationships-a model that has been extremely
influential in clinical legal education. 60 Carl Rogers, a central figure in
the development of this model, was opposed to the use of positive or
negative judgments of the client by the helping professional. 61 In urging
that approval has a proper place in client-centered lawyering, I mean to
suggest as well that lawyer-client relations often differ in significant ways
from those between therapists and the people they treat.62
60. Binder, Bergman, and Price, for example, entitled their work Lawyers as Counselors"
A Client-Centered Approach. BINDER ET AL., supra note 1. Bastress and Harbaugh describe
their psychological premises as overlapping substantially with the "person-centered ap-
proach." BAsrRnss & HAAAUGH, supra note 3, at 57. Shaffer and Elkins similarly write that
they "borrow, in theory and in practice," from client-centeredness (as well as from other theo-
ries). SHAFFER & ELKINS, supra note 4, at 161. William Simon identifies several other in-
stances of the client-centered psychologist Carl Rogers' impact on legal scholarship. See
Simon, A New Legal Formalism, supra note 29, at 511-12 & n.93.
61. See CARL ROGERS, The Characteristics of a Helping Relationship, reprinted in THE
CARL ROGERS READER, supra note 26, at 108, 121-23; SHAFFER & ELINS, supra note 4, at
159; Simon, A New Legal Formalism, supra note 29, at 511-14.
62. It might further be argued that approval has a proper role even in psychotherapy.
Some schools of psychotherapy do, as Bastress and Harbaugh point out, endorse a much more
judgmental or directive style than client-centeredness advocates. See BAsTREss & HAR-
BAUGH, supra note 3, at 32-53, 55-56 (discussing behaviorism, rational-emotive therapy, trans-
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These relationships differ because lawyers and clients tend to have
different mutual objectives than do therapists and patients, even though
client-centered lawyers share with therapists an intense concern with
helping clients make decisions about their lives. The contrast between
the two professions is far from absolute or universal, for lawyers may
develop relationships with their clients that vary from instrumental to
intimate, just as therapists may play roles ranging from prolonged psy-
choanalysis to short-term intervention. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable
to say that client-centered lawyers usually seek to help clients make their
own decisions in order to get those decisions made, and made as well as
possible. Therapists, on the other hand, are not so often centrally con-
cerned with obtaining decisions on particular matters, and instead tend
to be relatively more focused on assisting the client to become the sort of
person who can make decisions.63
Since lawyers are less interested in helping the client become a dif-
ferent person, it seems likely that legal clients are often less vulnerable to
their helpers' domination than therapeutic patients are. Because lawyers'
clients probably do not normally need to open themselves up to their
helper as completely as do patients in therapy, there is less danger that
the use of approval will discourage needed revelations. Similarly, be-
cause lawyers' clients do not typically experience the same profound
sense of personal incapacity that plagues many therapeutic patients,
there is less risk that the sense of being judged, which approval may inad-
vertently generate, will add to the client's felt disempowerment.
None of this is to say that the problem of domination is absent in
lawyer-client relationships. The combination of lawyers' expertise and
clients' need often provides fertile soil for lawyer power to establish itself.
Indeed, in some of these relationships the professional's power may be
greater than it is in many therapeutic contexts. Many legal clients be-
come enmeshed in the law involuntarily and have little choice about
whether to turn to a lawyer for help; involuntary therapeutic clients do
exist but seem to be less common. Many legal clients are also divided
actional analysis, and reality therapy). I do not mean, however, to take any position on how
psychotherapists should do their work.
63. Bastress and Harbaugh emphasize a similar contrast. Id. at 20. Lawyers' focus on
getting the client to make decisions also reflects the reality that in many lawyer-client relation-
ships some decision must be made, usually after no more than a few meetings between the
lawyer and the client. While there are also many quasi-therapeutic interventions that must be
completed quickly, time pressure may well require the lawyer to press the client towards clo-
sure in a manner that therapists have much less occasion to use. Id at 57. Time pressure may
also make it important for the lawyer to use conventional and familiar techniques of building
relationships, such as approval, when a more leisurely approach could build client trust on
different bases.
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from their lawyers by profound cultural, ethnic, or other differences.
These gaps may produce a vulnerability comparable in intensity to that
felt by a therapeutic patient who, while psychically fragile, may more
closely resemble his therapist in socioeconomic respects.
The different sources of legal clients' vulnerability, however, suggest
that somewhat different strategies may be appropriate to alleviate this
problem. Albeit with some exaggeration, we might say that the therapist
must persuade her client to make himself more vulnerable to her by low-
ering the defenses on which he is accustomed to rely, whereas the lawyer
must persuade her client to become less vulnerable to her by reclaiming
the capacity to run his life that he ordinarily wields. In this effort, the
lawyer may well profit from the various kinds of bonds that approval can
generate, simply because approval is a common element of ordinary in-
teraction. Lawyers' clients may be reassured by signs that conventional
forms of interaction are suitable in the lawyer's office, while patients
might see the same responses from their therapist as disconcertingly in-
consistent with the special character of the therapeutic relationship.
To the extent that the legal client's vulnerability is a product of so-
cial disadvantage and subordination, a true solution may require changes
in the client's life outside the lawyer's office. To that end, some scholars
have envisioned a political engagement between lawyer and client, in
which lawyers enter into a relationship not so much of helping as of alli-
ance.64 In this vision, the solution to the problem of lawyers' power is
not-or not only-to reduce the lawyers' authority, but to enhance the
clients' capacity, in particular by participating with them in a struggle to
change the conditions of their lives. In many respects, this is a deeply
attractive, though perhaps unattainable, aspiration for lawyer-client rela-
tionships. Lawyers who see political struggle as the path to clients' per-
sonal empowerment, however, can hardly aspire to make expressions of
approval or disapproval off limits, for such expressions of opinion are
part and parcel of politics. Indeed, lawyers will presumably want to en-
courage their clients to offer such opinions themselves. To avoid discour-
aging this very result, lawyers committed to political alliance might well
restrain their own use of approval and disapproval, so as not to drown
out their clients. But such lawyers would have good reason not to alto-
64. See supra note 23 and sources cited there; see also DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND
JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 324-40 (1988) (describing the ethical implications of political
"comradeship" between lawyers and clients); William H. Simon, Visions of Practice in Legal
Thought, 36 STAN. L. REv. 469, 484-89 (1984) (articulating a "Critical vision" of lawyering, a
vision "animated by an ideal of practice as a process of constituting or reconstituting nonhier-
archical communities of interest"). The description of this political vision in the text is not
meant, however, as a precise restatement of any of these writers' views.
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gether foreswear giving voice to their positive and negative judgments,
for clients who look to their lawyers as political allies vill naturally ex-
pect to hear political opinions from them. And the ultimate goal of such
an alliance is not to free clients from the burden of hearing the lawyer's
views but to help the clients win the power to state their own views too.65
Finally, even if clients' vulnerability to lawyers had the same
sources, and the same solutions, as patients' vulnerability to therapists,
lawyers are vulnerable to clients in a special way that provides a concom-
itant justification for the use of approval. Lawyers who represent clients
must do something that therapists are much less frequently obliged to
do-namely, to take action that will help the client by damaging others.
This is not to understate the ethical dilemmas faced by therapists, who
may become painfully entangled in their patients' affairs, for example
when they learn that their patients intend to act unethically or danger-
ously.6 6 Usually, however, therapists are not called on either to make
their patients' wishes a reality or to prevent their patients from doing so
on their own. Lawyers, however, are routinely called upon to give posi-
tive aid to their clients in conduct that, although legal, may not be ethi-
cal. 67 As I have already suggested, lawyers who respond to this prospect
by engaging their clients in a moral dialogue cannot refrain from offering
approval when their clients actually come to agree with what the lawyers
have urged. 68
The contrasts I have outlined between the responsibilities of lawyers
and therapists have been drawn with a broad brush. Even put so
broadly, these differences do not suggest that the lessons of client-cen-
tered psychology should be ignored in client-centered lawyering. On the
contrary, the guidance of client-centered psychology has been an ex-
tremely fruitful source for clinical legal educators' efforts to reshape the
contours of legal practice. Nonetheless, it is important for us to remem-
65. By no means every lawyer who feels political sympathy for her clients, however,
would subscribe to this vision of alliance. At the "Theoretics of Practice" conference Nancy
Polikoff vividly and thoughtfully described her own practice, in which she has resisted telling
clients what she feels they should do even when she had deep political and personal bonds to
them.
66. See, eg., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976).
67. William Simon emphasized the impact that lawyers' and clients' work together has
on third parties in his critique of what he called the "Psychological Vision" of lawyering,
noting an over-emphasis on "the immediate and the personal aspects of the lawyer-client rela-
tion." See Simon, A New Legal Formalism, supra note 29, at 502.
68. See supra text accompanying notes 35-39. Bastress and Harbaugh also recognize that
in undertaking a moral dialogue the lawyer "move[s] beyond the Rogerians." BASTRESS &
HARBAUGH, supra note 3, at 57.
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ber that all helping relationships are not the same. Here, as elsewhere,
theory can mislead as well as enlighten, and it may be that the very
power of cient-centeredness as a model has distracted us, to some extent,
from an appreciation of the unique features of the lawyer-client relation-
ship. This Essay's examination of the technique of approval thus seeks to
contribute both to a continued critical analysis of psychological models
of lawyering, and to our search for other, complementary theoretical
frameworks within which to understand more fully the work of lawyers.

